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Stacked Competition and Phony
Deregulation for AT&T: The
Proposed "Telecommunications
Competition and Deregulation Act
of 1981"
By Louis B. SCHWARTZ*
The United States is negotiating to surrender to American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T). The surrender is embodied in the
proposed Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act
of 1981, S. 898, recently passed by the Senate,' and in the talkedof dismissal of a long-fought antitrust case against AT&T. In the
coming months the House of Representatives will be debating the
telecommunications bill. The House vote will be the last chance to
avoid a dramatic reversal of this country's century-old commitment to competition and to decentralization of economic power.
AT&T is the world's largest "private" enterprise, two or three
times the size of Exxon, the second largest firm.2 Its dominant
power is underlined by the fact that it conducts major areas of its
business under monopoly franchises legally protecting it against
competition. Despite its title, S. 898 extends the power of AT&T,
threatens competition in many unregulated businesses which it invites AT&T to penetrate, and adds more regulation than it
eliminates.
* Benjamin Franklin and University Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; author, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (5th ed. 1977 with J. Flynn retitled
ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES).

1. See S. Rep. 97-170, of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., July 27, 1981. At the time of this writing, prints of S. 898 in the
form that it passed the Senate are unavailable. References in this article are to the version
approved by the Senate Committee. But account is taken of some subsequent amendments.
See, e.g., as to floor action on amendments, 127 Cong. Rec. S11195, Oct. 7, 1981.
2. Uttal, How to DeregulateAT&T, FORTUNE, Nov. 30, 1981, at 70. For comparisons of
AT&T with Exxon and others, see FORTUNE Annual Double-500 Directory, 1970. On
AT&T's exercise of political power, see M. MINTZ & J. COHEN, AMERICA INC.: WHo OwNs
AND OPERATES THE UNITED STATES 248 (1971).
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Provisions of the Bill
The bill's main features are as follows. It authorizes AT&T to
engage in non-carrier, non-regulated business,s provided that the
business is carried on through a "fully-separated affiliate"' (hereinafter referred to as FSA). These new offshoots of AT&T have been
referred to collectively as "Baby Bell," but it is not clear whether
Baby Bell might be one large or many smaller units. S. 898 contains elaborate provisions directed against AT&T's subsidizing or
favoring its FSA's and charging the FCC with regulatory responsibility to: police this new boundary between regulated and unregulated aspects of AT&T's operations.' The bill extends the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission to regulate long
distance calls by giving the Commission jurisdiction over such calls
whether or not they cross state lines." The bill does promote competition in several respects;7 however, some of these changes have
been and are being effectuated through litigation under existing
law, and in any event could easily be enacted separately from the
legislative bonanza for AT&T embodied in S. 898.

The Issues
Three main issues will be explored: (1) whether AT&T should be
allowed to expand its operations beyond regulated public utility
communications services, transforming itself into something much
more comprehensive which supplies as well as carries "knowledge";
(2) whether AT&T should, instead, be trimmed back by forcing it
to divest its control of local telephone service and of vast non-pub3. Certain narrow exceptions to this authority are discussed below.
4. The term is defined in S. 898 § 227.
5. See, e.g., S. 898 §§ 202, 227.
6. S. 898 § 102(a) (FCC jurisdiction over all "interexchange" and foreign telecommunications). In principle, this is a wise move because the long distance network should be regulated as a unit. It is favorable to AT&T since the company thus escapes the jurisdictions of
state regulatory commissions, some of which have been more effective at regulation than the
FCC and others of which have sought to shift local costs to the longlines toll system.
7. Among other provisions, section 204 authorizes purchasers of Bell package services to
share or resell parts of the package; sections 207, 216(b) and 222 effectively require AT&T
to provide local telephone connections for microwave and other long-distance services competitive with AT&T; and section 234 shields independent suppliers of telephones and other
"customer premises equipment" from state regulatory restraints designed to favor the Bell
System. The most significant "deregulation" suggested is deregulation of microwave and
other message carriers competitive with AT&T, so long as they are subject to "effective
competition." It remains to be seen whether FCC responsibilities and activities in the area
of maintaining "effective competition" during and after the statutory transition period will
qualify either as effective competition or as deregulation.
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lic utility operations carried on, for example, by its Western Electric subsidiary, which manufacturers telephone and other electronic gear for sale largely to the captive market of the Bell
System; and (3) whether safeguards against exploitation of
AT&T's monopoly position, particularly the "fully-separated affiliate" device proposed in S. 898, would be effective.

Expansion of AT&T's Power Despite Proclivity to
Monopolize
Expansion of the giant communications company into a colossal
"knowledge" company is forbidden under the terms of a 1956 court
order based on earlier monopolistic activity of AT&T.8 It is worth
recalling that the 1956 judgment was a consent decree entered in a
suit brought under Democratic President Truman in 1949 and settled on terms favorable to AT&T under Republican President Eisenhower. The deal was widely criticized as a surrender to AT&T
because it failed to achieve the divestiture which alone could prevent continuing abuse.'
In light of the 1956 decree, the proposed expansion of AT&T's
scope contemplated by S. 898 is breathtaking. "Information services" as defined in S. 898 embraces "generating, acquiring, utilizing or making available" knowledge. If any question is left of the
impact of the legislative language, AT&T's exultant propaganda
campaign fills in the -picture. Double-page spreads in eight colors
reveal the colossus's new image of itself.o A spectrum or map of
the "knowledge business" is depicted, running from Plato on the
left to AT&T's new domain on the right. Territories already conquered by AT&T are colored blue, like the red of the British empire on old world maps demonstrating that the sun never sets on
imperial Britain. Some provinces of knowledge are conceded to
8. United States v. Western Electric Co. and American Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
1946 Trade Cas. 168,246 (D.N.J. 1956). This decree would be virtually eliminated by S. 898.
See S. 898 § 229.
9. See Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee,
85th Cong., 2d Sess., part II, vol. 1, ser. no. 9 (1958). The breadth of exceptions in the decree
and the flexibility of its terms have recently been underlined in United States v. Western
Electric Co., 1031 AmitRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-10 (D.N.J. 1981), from which an
appeal is pending in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In that case, upon a petition by AT&T for a construction of the 1956 decree, the district court sustained the authority of the FCC to "deregulate" the supply by AT&T of certain products and services while
allowing AT&T to continue to operate in these deregulated markets. Id.
10. E.g., SCIEfNIFc AMERICAN, June, 1981, at 10-11; THE NEW YORKER, June 18, 1981, at
90-91 ("The knowledge business").
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have been opened up by others in the past, although plainly AT&T
plans to take care of future development of these primitive innovations. Ancient Greek mathematicians get credit for algebra, geometry, and astronomy. Galileo and Copernicus get nods for introducing heliocentrism. Gutenberg is accorded the invention of printing,
and Daguerre the beginnings of photography. Beyond this, all is
AT&T's blue. Only the most powerful lobbies succeeded in holding
off AT&T's embrace by amending S. 898 to exclude "cable service,
mass media, or mass media product" from exploitation through the
FSA device. Otherwise, AT&T aims to become our publisher, our
teacher, our entertainer, our data processor, our researcher, our library and our repository of science.
Since the 1956 antitrust judgment, numerous private antitrust
suits have demonstrated AT&T's proclivity to violate the antitrust
laws by suppressing competition that would undermine its monopoly." Potential low-cost competition in long-distance service was
restrained by prolonged bitter resistance to the FCC's licensing of
competing microwave systems and by refusing to permit essential
link-ups of such systems to the local telephone networks operated
by AT&T subsidiaries. Monopolistic control of telephone equipment and supplies was maintained by causing the controlled Bell
subsidiaries to buy from Western Electric rather than from independent suppliers. Control of the market for auxiliary telephone
appliances was maintained by refusing to permit "foreign attachments," on the pretext that they would impair the operation of the
phone system. AT&T's edge over independent firms as a supplier
of data processing rests largely on the fact that independents must
use AT&T's telephone network to send and receive the data. The
cost of communication constitutes a major fraction of the aggregate cost of data processing. Since the FCC's regulation of communications rates has been notoriously ineffectual, AT&T itself effectively fixes the height of the cost barriers that competing data
processors must surmount.
11. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 462 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (a verdict
for $1.8 billion, presently on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
based on denial of essential interconnections for a competing long distance service and on
predatory pricing tactics); Litton Industries v. AT&T, 1981-2 Trade Cas. 1164,306 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) ($92 million verdict, to be trebled, based on illegal exclusion of Litton from the telephone equipment manufacturing business). Cf. AT&T Former Chief Testifies on Efforts to
Bar Competition to Protect Quality and Rates, Wall St. J., August 28, 1981, at 4 (deButts,
former chairman of the Bell System "conceded under cross-examination that AT&T never
was able to provide specific evidence that any equipment made by other companies had
harmed the Bell network").
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The foregoing practices are the basis of the latest government
prosecution of AT&T under the antitrust laws.12 The company has

already spent over $100,000,000 on defense against the charge and
has attempted to treat these expenses as telephone costs chargeable against the ratepayer.'s

The Position and Propaganda of the Reagan
Administration
Following the example of the Eisenhower Administration, the
Reagan Administration proposes to drop the antitrust suit in exchange for token concessions by AT&T. Furthermore, the Administration is making every effort to procure the enactment of S. 898,
which would affirmatively sanction extension of AT&T's operations into non-regulated fields. The Administration's efforts include an unprecedented barrage of misleading propaganda. The
public has been led to believe: (1) that expansion of AT&T is essential to AT&T's financial requirements and technological progress, without which it cannot compete successfully with foreign

companies; (2) that the antitrust suit aims to "break-up" our communications networks, endangering national defense; and (3) that
S. 898 deregulates, promotes competition, and would prevent abuse
of monopoly position by requiring AT&T's expanded operations to
be conducted as FSA's.
Leading the Administration's chorus is Secretary of Commerce
Malcolm Baldrige. Baldrige chaired a cabinet-level task force on
telecommunications and believes that the antitrust suit is an "obstacle to the industry's ability to attract the investment required to
maintain the U.S. lead against foreign competition." 4 The absurdity of these crocodile tears for AT&T's investment problems is exposed by recent financial reports of the company showing record
earnings," by the company's repeated demonstrations of the power
12. United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., Civ. No. 74-1698 (D.D.C.,
filed Nov. 20, 1974) (summary of complaint 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1145,074, No. 2416; see
also 1031 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) H-1 (Sept. 17, 1981) (denying defense motion to dismiss).
13. In re Michigan Bell Tel. Co., Mich. P.S.C. Case No. U-6002, April 1, 1980.
14. Warner and Taylor, Cabinet Council is DebatingAT&T Case, May Recommend U.S.
Drop Antitrust Suit, Wall St. J., June 19, 1981, at 7, col. 1.
15. AT&T Granted Long Distance Return of 12.75%, Wall St. J., April 7, 1981, at 4, col.
1; AT&T Net Rose 11% to Record in May 31 Period, Wall St. J., June 18, 1981, at 6, col. 1;
AT&T Net Rose 22% to Record in August 31 Period, Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1981, at 2, col. 2;
AT&T Net Rose 23% to Record in Three Months, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1981, at 6.
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to sell virtually unlimited amounts of securities at advantageous
prices, and by the FCC's recent generous treatment of AT&T's
rate of return on investment."
Baldrige makes no secret of his disregard of the antitrust law.
He wants the suit dismissed explicitly without concern for the legal
merits, but as a matter of "national interest" revitalizing the U.S.
telecommunications industry." Baldrige's Task Force on Telecommunications did not even have a representative from the Department of Justice, which is perhaps just as well since Attorney General William French Smith and his Chief Deputy Edward Schmults
have past ties with AT&T.18 President Reagan has personally participated in the discussion of the Task Force proposals. The Administration's effort to shoulder aside the Antitrust Division in
White House consideration of telecommunications policy is paralleled by the Republican drive in Congress to keep S. 898 out of the
hands of the Congressional committees which normally deal with
16. See Warner, FCC Officials Shown Dwelling on Image Rather Than Issue, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 9, 1981, at 12, col. 1. The article, based on videotapes of the FCC Commissioners'
meeting, revealed that
their discussion dwelt on how to minimize the public relations fallout of the record-setting increase to 13% . . . that they clearly already had determined they
wanted to grant the company .... Lee noted it was going to take some doing to
structure the 13% increase so it wouldn't look as if they had "rolled over for the
company." . . . Lee offered a solution: "What appealed to me was 12.5 and a
range. You're actually giving them 13, but it doesn't look like you've rolled over
for the company."
A range it would be, they decided. "The range thing is public relations," Mr.
Quello said approvingly. But the record in the case didn't provide the usual rationale for a range, which is to allow the company flexibility for productivity changes.
"Think up some good reasons," Mr. Lee told the staff. The room erupted in
laughter.
17. Taylor, Reagan Offer to Drop AT&T Trust Suit Prodded by Fears of Foreign Competition, Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1981, at 6, col. 5 (Baldrige is quoted as saying: "the task force [on
telecommunications] 'didn't in any way address the merits of the AT&T suit.'"
AT&T/Western Electric is not waiting for Congressonal relief on the foreign competition
front and apparently does not need it. See Sease, AT&T Gives Job to Unit, Rejects Low
ForeignBid, Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1981, at 48, col. 1. A Japanese supplier was turned down on
the ground that "national interest" required that the project be let to an American firm so
as to encourage American development of the new technology of glass fibre lines using lasergenerated beams of light to carry communications. Not surprisingly, Western Electric was
the favored American firm. Alexander Stark, executive vice president of AT&T's Long Lines
Department "declined, however, to specify the amount or the identity of the domestic bidders other than Western Electric." Id. (emphasis added).
Compare Chace, Outside Suppliers Find That Ringing Up Sales With AT&T Isn't
Easy-'Like Competing With God,' Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1981, at 1, col. 5.
18. See White House Supports AT&T's Expansion Into Areas Currently Barred to Company, Wall St. J., June 12, 1981 at 3, col. 2.
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antitrust issues. It was the compliant Senate Committee on Commerce which pushed the bill and opposed any referral to the Judiciary Committee.
Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, weighs into the fight
with ridiculous assertions that national security is threatened by
the "break-up" of AT&T's communications network." No such
"break-tip" of physical connections is contemplated by the lawsuit
or proposed by anyone. Long-distance lines would continue to be
connected with local telephone systems even if AT&T must sell its
stock in the controlled regional telephone companies. Efficient
technological cooperation can exist without financial domination,
as is shown by the excellent interchange between AT&T, the nonBell independent telephone companies in this country, and foreign
telephone systems. The American telephone system as a whole can
only benefit if AT&T and the operating companies must buy their
equipment in competitive markets rather than in cozy transactions
with AT&T's Western Electric Co. The Secretary of Defense would
be well advised to abandon efforts to adapt the economic and political structure of the United States to the needs, real or imagined,
of the military. 0
William Baxter, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, has courageously opposed the pressures to drop
the antitrust suit, despite his conservative views on antitrust enforcement. He was, however, compelled to approve a request for an
eleven-month suspension of the trial. That delay, the Administration hoped, would suffice for the enactment of S. 898. Baxter loyally aligns himself with the Administration on S. 898, although it is
hard to see how he can support legislation so opposed in principle
to the lawsuit's attack on concentration of economic power. There
may come a point at which Baxter, a former professor of law at
Stanford, will have to follow Archibald Cox's famous example in
the Watergate case by resigning rather than yielding to White
19. Mossberg, Weinberger Feared Breakup of AT&T Would Hurt Units, Wall St. J., Apr.
2, 1981, at 2. According to the article, Weinberger's concern was with divestiture of the
regional telephone companies because they "serve critical elements of the nation's nuclear
attack force . . . which must rely on speedy, highly reliable telephone links." AT&T was not
slow to pick up (if it did not inspire) this ludicrous theme. It "asserted in court that breaking up . .. could weaken U.S. military security." Taylor, AT&T Antitrust Suit's Dismissal
Urged by Defense Chief, Citing Nation's Security, Wall St. J., April 8, 1981, at 6, col. 1
(emphasis added).
20. See Brown, Bill Shifts Phone Role to Military, Washington Post, Sept. 27, 1981, at A1, col. 1, reporting concerns not only of competitors of AT&T, but also of civil liberties
groups.
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House pressure.

"Safeguards" Against Abuse
If the dangers of divestiture are mythical and the anticompetitive threat of AT&T's vast power is real, what of the "safeguards"
against abuse provided by requiring new operations to be conducted through FSA's? The short answer is that the safeguards are
a fraud. The conjunction of "separate" and "affiliate" is Orwellian
"newspeak." The affiliates will not be fully or even significantly
separated: AT&T's right to "direct" their operations is expressly
affirmed in the pending bill." AT&T can name the directors and
officers. AT&T will staff the affiliates. AT&T will provide or deny
financing. It is sheer fantasy to suppose that such affiliates will not
shape their price, service, and other commercial policies to favor
and protect AT&T, or that AT&T will not lend them every discriminatory support that it can get away with.
The chief aim of S. 898 is to create the impression that such
favor by the corporate parent can be prevented by requiring separate accounting systems for the subsidiaries and by forbidding
specified acts of inter-firm discriminaton. S. 898 purports to prohibit AT&T from using its monopoly public utility rates to subsidize its unregulated competitive ventures; but it is much easier to
proscribe than to police such anti-discrimination measures. The
General Accounting Office, independent watchdog for the federal
government, as well as the Department of Justice and Fortune
magazine, has recorded skepticism of such policing." In any event,
nothing in S. 898 would touch the basic handicaps under which
other firms would compete with AT&T affiliates: the limitless
21. See S. 898 § 202(d): except as relations between dominant firm and FSA are explicitly
regulated, "nothing shall preclude management personnel of a dominant-regulated carrier
from dircting the operations of . . . any fully separated affiliates."
22. Report of the General Accounting Office, B-203706, released Sept. 24, 1981; Uttal,
How to Deregulate AT&T, FORTUNE, Nov. 30, 1981, p. 70, at 75 ("The lists of ways around
'full separation' is limited only by imagination."); see also Report of the House Judiciary
Committee on H.R.6121, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (predecessor to S. 898, 97th Cong.). In the
field of railroad transportation, it has been law for three quarters of a century that the
carrier shall not transport commodities "in which it may have an interest, direct or indirect,
except . . . for its use in the conduct of its business as a common carrier." 49 U.S.C. § 1(8).
Examples of the ineffectiveness of regulating discrimination in favor of separate affiliates
are United States v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 298 U.S. 492 (1936); United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 360 U.S. 19 (1959). Cf. United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S.
316 (1961) (divestiture of DuPont stock interest in General Motors required despite DuPont's offer to abstain from voting, i.e., to "fully separate").
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favorable financing which AT&T would enjoy;" the public relations and advertising bonanzas derived from association with the
omnipresent Bell System; and the exemption of FSA's from the
bill's safeguards when trade in foreign markets is involved. No prohibition will stop AT&T from shaping its research and development plans to fit the needs of the "separate" affiliates which it "directs." No prohibition can prevent AT&T officers from leaking
advance information or hints to fellow officers in the system.
Above all, no AT&T employees transferred to affiliates, as allowed
under S. 898," can be stopped from using what they know for the
exclusive benefit of the affiliate.
Finally, the "safeguard" system is further compromised by authorizing "joint ventures" between AT&T and the FSA's,2 5 by permitting AT&T to transfer even communications facilities to the
FSA (thus undoing the supposed "separation"), and by pervasive
"emergency" exceptions to the bill's requirements."
The hypocrisy of the safeguards system is exposed in the latest
response to criticisms of the inside track that Western Electric
would continue to enjoy as equipment supplier to the system.
Under the "open procurement" amendment proposed by the Administration last August to make S. 898 more palatable, Bell operating companies could not buy equipment from Western Electric
unless Western Electric demonstrated its ability to sell the same
equipment to independent buyers. Passing over the problems of
determining what is the "same equipment" and who is an "independent buyer" (Bell has close relations with many non-owned
telephone companies), it is enough to note that under the complex
formula originally proposed, Western Electric would have to sell
less than 1% to outsiders at first, a figure rising only to less than
7% in ten years." Small wonder that Assistant Attorney General
Baxter continued to insist that only divestiture can insure against
23. On the potentialities of "predatory investment" to saturate a market otherwise potentially open to others, see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416.(2d Cir.
1945); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979).
24. See S. 898 § 224(b) relating to transferred employees.
25. See S. 898 § 227(b).
26. E.g., S. 898 §§ 227(g) and 233(a) (the commission shall consult with the President to
order whatever is necessary "[t]o ensure the continuity of telecommunications essential to
the national defense").
27. 1027 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Aug. 13, 1981) A-9. It is reported that
under a last minute amendment in the Senate, prompted by Assistant Attorney General
Baxter, the final figure might rise in 13 years as high as 24%.
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discrimination and cross-subsidy."

The Pretense of Deregulation
The ultimate hypocrisy of Administration support of S. 898 lies
in representing the bill as "deregulation," a very popular slogan
these days. The bill in fact imposes a mind-boggling new regulatory responsibility on the FCC." There are complex provisions for
FCC proceedings to approve the organization of the "fully separated affiliate" system and to review its operation. With regard to
AT&T's transactions with affiliates, the bill requires FCC regulation to distinguish between "commercial" and other sorts of information, between final assemblies and sub-assemblies or components, and between "institutional" and other preferences. AT&T
would be forbidden to sell to affiliates at less than market value,
unless AT&T demonstrates to the FCC that the "direct" cost of
dealing with the affiliate is lower, or that the transaction promotes "efficiency." This appalling regulatory structure was discussed at the Ninth Annual Telecommunications Policy Research
Conference,o where those who favored AT&T's freedom to expand, as well as those who opposed it, condemned the "fully separated affiliate" device as burdensome and ineffectual.
The deregulation ploy, as a diversion from the real issue, is admirably summed up in Fortune's quotation from a "staffer" of the
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, chaired by Congressman Wirth (D.-Colo.): "The issue here isn't deregulaton but
competition.,. . . [T]he Senate went ahead as though AT&T were

just like the airlines or trucking industry instead of a monopolist.
28. In a brief filed by the Department of Justice in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia on Oct. 30, 1981, Baxter challenged the FCC's "deregulation"
program, which like S. 898 purports to free the company to engage in unregulated business
provided it does so through fully separated subsidiaries: "The commission's decision is remarkable for its blind faith that the necessary accounting tools, heretofore non-existent, will
be developed in time to ensure the success of its [deregulation] scheme." Justice Dept. Appeals Telephone Deregulation,Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 4, 1981, § E, at 1 (story by the
Associated Press).
29. See especially S. 898 §§ 227, 238. "The emerging political solution is a kind of deregulation that relies on scrutiny by the FCC of the relationship between Ma and Baby. And
that means more regulatory activity, not less." Uttal, supra note 22, at 75.
30. The conference was co-sponsored by the Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Science Foundation, The John and Mary Markle Foundation, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Province of Ontario Ministry of Transportation and
Communications, The M. L. Annenberg Foundation, and the Benton Foundation, April 2629, 1981, Annapolis, Maryland.
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We wouldn't have deregulated the airlines if United had owned
85% of the airports and the airplanes, flew most of the route miles,
controlled Boeing, was into parking franchises, and was getting
ready to go into the car rental business.""
Conclusion: A Constructive Framework For New
Legislation
Underlying all the particular defects of S. 898 is the absence of
any basic or unifying philosophy. Do we or do we not continue to
believe that private firms can become too big for effective management, too big for the safety of their competitors and of the competitive system, and too big to be controlled by government? Have
we forgotten the recent demonstrations of the spuriousness of
claims to the superior efficiencies of giant combines? 2 Does anyone conceive that if Western Electric were today an independent
manufacturing company, its acquisition by AT&T would be regarded as consistent with the Clayton Act prohibition of mergers
"where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition"?
Would we today permit AT&T, which purveys long-distance service to regional and independent local telephone companies, to acquire control of these customers, thus circumscribing their freedom
to patronize alternate suppliers of long-distance service? Should
we tolerate the perpetuation of the management service contracts
by which AT&T binds the regional Bell companies to its chariot,
exacting a flat fee for management services that the well-paid
heads of the great regional Bell companies should be performing
for themselves or purchasing in a competitive market for management consultant services?"
If we adhere to the philosophy of the antitrust and public utility
laws, it would still be necessary to adapt regulation to new situations created by advancing technology. That kind of reconsidera31. Uttal, supra note 22, at 73.
32. Consider the problems of these giants: Chrysler; Penn-Central R.R.; Pan Am/National
Airlines; Exxon/Reliance; International Harvester; and Lockheed.
33. Compare the constraints on intra-system service, sales, and construction contracts imposed by section 13 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79m(d).
Among other things, section 13 provides for regulation of "mutual service companies," including the requirement that services be rendered "at cost fairly and equitably allocated
... [and] at a reasonable saving to member companies over the cost to such companies of
comparable contracts performed by independent persons." A member company which, "by
reason of its size or other circumstances, does not require such service" may not be charged
therefor.
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tion might lead to constructive and effective new legislation as
follows.
First, effective legislation would reaffirm and strengthen the
principle of the 1956 Antitrust Decree. The loopholes3" in the 1956
decree which render it virtually unenforcable must be closed.
AT&T should be barred from engaging directly or indirectly in
businesses within the domain of ordinary competitive enterprise.
In principle, 5 it should be confined to the role of regulated carrier
in fields where effective competition is precluded by "natural monopoly," huge capital requirements, or other very high entry
barriers.
Second, effective legislation would define the scope of permissible engagement in operations "incidental" to regulated carriage. It
must be recognized that regulated utilities, as a matter of prudent
utility operation, must frequently engage, to some degree, in competitive markets. A coal-burning electric power company probably
should be allowed to acquire coal reserves as inventory and perhaps as a hedge against market uncertainties. A telephone company with peculiar dependency on computers and software should
be permitted and encouraged to develop internal technological resources. But this is far from saying that it is justified in launching
itself full-scale into the other business. If, in the course of operations suitable for a prudent telephone company, it acquires technology or data processing capacity which competitive industry can
use, the proper course would be to license or lease that "excess"
capacity to firms in the competitive sector. By hypothesis, ratepayers would have financed the underlying research and should be
entitled to the benefits; likewise, the capital contribution to the
technological advance would in principle have been contributed by
the telephone investors, and they should receive appropriate credit
by inclusion of that capital in the rate base. But novel incentive
and reward arrangements may be called for. For example, profits
34. E.g., permitting AT&T to sell products "of a type" used by its operating companies in
rendering regulated communications service.
35. Narrow exceptions might be envisioned for the establishment of new technologies useful in telecommunications until these technologies can be sustained on a competitive basis.
For example, consider the antitrust tolerance of tying arrangements for limited periods necessary to introduce new technology. See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187
F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1954 Trade Cas. (W.D.N.Y. Civ. No. 6450) (consent decree requiring separation of charges for color film and processing). Compare IBM's "unbundling" of charges for
computer hardware and software. Wall St. J., June 24, 1969, at 38.
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on extra-system exploitation of technological advances might be
shared between ratepayers and investors."
Third, effective legislation would require AT&T to come forward
with a proposed plan of reorganization and simplification following
the procedure of § 11 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935."8 As under that Act, "substantial economies" allegedly attributable -to centralized control by a holding company would have
to be measured against potential impairment of "the advantages of
localized management, efficient operation, or the effectiveness of
regulation." 8
Fourth, effective legislation would redefine the service obligation
of regulated communications carriers to include not only competing carriers' right to interconnect monopolistic local telephone exchanges, but also an obligation to construct specialized facilities,
reasonably demanded, to handle new communications systems,
particularly CATV. Thus far the CATV issue has been posed
mainly in terms of whether the carrier may engage in the CATV
business. But if the carrier were confined to carriage and compelled to provide facilities which might be used by as many
CATV operators as the market could support, the present controversies over who should be permitted to build and maintain such
facilities would be resolved, and the monopolistic market-division
aspects of CATV would be substantially ameliorated. One can even
envision the achievement by this means of competition in the
"natural monopoly" field of local telephone service since the
CATV, unlike broadcasting makes possible two-way communication.
A searching inquiry along the foregoing lines would not yield
"stacked competition and phony deregulation for AT&T," but a
socially useful, philosophically defensible, and administratively
feasible synthesis of regulated monopoly and genuine competition.

36. Compare the sharing of returns on past excess earnings of the utility in L.
& J. FLYNN, ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVEs 730-32 (5th ed. 1977).

SCHWARTZ

37.. 15 U.S.C. § 79k.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 11(b)(1)(C). See S.E.C. v. New England Elec. System, 384 U.S. 176 (1966).
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